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WHAT CAUSES BANK ASSET SUBSTITUTION IN KAZAKHSTAN?  











Dollarization comes in several forms.  The type that this paper examines is asset 
substitution, when savers hold dollar assets in bank accounts, instead of local currency.  This 
paper estimates demand for dollar accounts.  It shows that inflation risk explains asset 
dollarization more effectively than exchange risk. This result is unexpected.  Households are 
more motivated than firms are to store assets in dollar accounts.   
This study examines data from Kazakhstan.  Kazakhstan has a strong banking system and 
a healthy economy for a former Soviet Republic.  It is seen as one of the most market-oriented, 
FSU countries.  However, Kazakhstan also has a large demand for a means of storing savings in 
dollars, rather than in the local currency.   
The paper combines statistical methods with anecdotal information in order to improve 
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Introduction. 
The former Soviet Union (FSU) exhibits higher degrees of dollarization than do other transition 
countries, that is Central and Eastern European states, according to Feige (2003).  This is not 
surprising. The Soviet Union had less development of market-oriented economic institutions, 
and it began transition to a market economy later than non-FSU, transition economies.  Of the 
FSU countries, Kazakhstan is one of the most dollarized economies. 
When we speak of dollarization, we mean the use of any foreign currency, as a substitute 
for the domestic currency.  Dollarization can be currency substitution, if there is a preference for 
trading in a foreign currency, or asset substitution, if there is a preference for saving in a foreign 
currency.  Asset dollarization occurs in Kazakhstan when a saver choose to save in a dollar 
saving account, rather than in a tenge saving account.  
The currency of Kazakhstan, adopted in 1993, is  the tenge.
2 Only the tenge can serve as 
legal tender.  Holding dollars and saving in dollars is legal, but purchases are made with tenge.
3 
This does not mean that prices are not often given in dollars.  
There is another form of dollarization that is not discussed in the literature, which I refer 
to as “price-normalizing dollarization.”  This occurs when goods and services are quoted in 
dollar prices, but are paid in local currency.  This arises frequently, in places such as 
Kazakhstan, when the commodity is a “large-ticket” (price-elastic) item,
4 or the seller wishes to 
insure against exchange-rate fluctuation, but payment must be made in the local currency. 
There is some confusion in popular writing of the phrase, “dollarization of prices,” with 
international price convergence.  This is a misuse of the term dollarization.   
The interesting question to ask about a dollarized economy is how much of the money 
supply is made up from foreign currencies?  One cannot directly observe the degree of currency 
                                                           
2 “Tenge,” pronounced “ten-g∋′” or “teng-g∋′.”   This  is the Turkí. The word for money, so it serves as both 
singular - 1 tenge - and plural - 10 tenge.  At the present, 1.5 tenge equal approximately 1 U.S. cent, or 150 tenge to 
the dollar. 
3 At present, these are the currency restrictions in the Republic of Kazakhstan: 
•  “All payments on operations between residents should be made only in currency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
except for cases stipulated by normative legal acts of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well 
as tax and customs legislation;  
•  Purchase, sale and exchange of foreign currency, omitting authorized banks and authorized organizations 
carrying out separate kinds of bank operations, as well as their exchange offices, are forbidden. 
4 Examples of items for which prices are given in dollars, though goods are paid for with tenge, are: lodging, 
automobiles, cell-phone and cable TV services, artists’ work, and electronics.  
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substitution.  In countries such as Kazakhstan, it is far easier to gauge asset dollarization, which 
can be directly observed.  These  banking data are reported to the central bank. 
Data are available from the Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan, IMF, and the National 
Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK).  The National Bank of Kazakhstan’s recent data are assumed to be 
the most correct, as the National Bank is the reporting authority on all matters regarding asset-
holding in Kazakhstan.  These data series indicate high levels of dollarization with a preference 
by households for foreign currency asset holding. 
When the USSR crumbled and the financial sector liberalized, many people continued to 
prefer dollars to other foreign currencies.
5  When prices, which were controlled under the 
planned economic system were freed, inflation resulted, as domestic prices adjusted to meet 
international prices.  Those who were holding foreign currency when the Soviet Union dissolved 
were far better off than those who were holding rapidly depreciating rubles. 
Today, acquiring foreign currency is simple in transition countries with liberalized 
financial sectors, such as Kazakhstan.  Money-changing kiosks are found easily in the cities.  
One may change the local currency into dollars, euros, rubles, or currencies of neighboring 
Central Asian states.
6 Firms and households use saving accounts, which may or may not be 
interest bearing, and one may save in the local or in dollars. 
Checking accounts are nonexistent, and debit cards are uncommon.  Pre-paid “credit” 
card accounts are available, but uncommon. A lack of “Rule of Law” makes it impossible to 
implement time-saving, liquidity-increasing, financial instruments for consumers, so trade is 
cash-based.  More developed credit instruments will increase the demand for tenge assets.   
It is not possible to  separate dollar account savers who are local and who are foreign, as 
one cannot differentiate in the data between accounts held by locals and those held by foreigner-
households or foreign firms.  It is also not possible to correctly gauge dollars held for 
transactions, currency substitution, which is why Feige has to use a proxy system.   
It  is possible, however, to show how some factors influence household and firm 
willingness to save in dollars versus tenge. Research in this field has not yet explained what 
                                                           
5 In Kazakhstan, the domestic currency is worth more euros than dollars.  Nevertheless, individuals are likely to 
hold dollars and less likely to hold euros or legacy currencies.  Bank deposits are available in dollars, though euro-
accounts are not.  Dollars are more likely to serve as a medium of exchange, than is the euro. 
6 Although China is also Kazakhstan‘s neighbor, it is not easy to change tenge into the currency of China.  
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causes dollarization in transition countries. This paper expands our understanding of what 
influences willingness to substitute currencies in asset saving in a transitional economy. 
Dollarization Analysis. 
An official (Kazakhstani) source provided data that suggested that dollarization ranged from 13 
to 28 percent and declined after 1998.  This is consistent with an IMF publication that indicated 
21.8 percent dollarization in 1995. According to Erlan Zamaubetov of the National Bank, the 
ratio FCD/TCD rose to 50 percent in 2002, but had fallen to 44 percent in March 2003.
7  The 
NBK data indicte that in May 2003, 49 percent of currency held in Kazakh banks was held in 
tenge accounts; 51 percent was held in dollar accounts.   
Feige’s work estimates dollarization using a proxy system. He estimates that per capita 
foreign currency in circulation in 2001
8 ranged from 5 to 10 USD in Macedonia and Uzbekistan 
to 1,024 and 1,209 in Kazakhstan and Latvia.
9  Feige estimates that dollars accounted for 95 
percent of total currency in Kazakhstan.  “The highest percentage of [foreign currency in 
circulation] holdings is found in Kazakhstan, with Russian Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Latvia all 
having more than 70 percent of their total currency supply held in the form of [foreign currency 
in circulation].”
10  If Feige’s statistics are anywhere near being correct, there is a great deal of 
U.S. dollars floating around in the economy.  Yet, this is a cash society where dollars are not 
accepted for purchases in most cases.  One explanation for where these dollars are going is asset 
dollarization. 
What is asset-dollarization? 
Asset-substitution dollarization is defined as the ratio of foreign currency deposits (FCD) to total 
currency deposits (TCD). In the case of Kazakhstan, the deposit ratio (DEP) that measures asset 






= .  Depending on which source of 
data is used, this ratio may vary.   
                                                           
7 The source for this is a talk that was given by this National Bank official at KIMEP in Spring 2003. 
8 Feige, E. 2003. The Dynamics of Currency Substitution, Asset Substitution and De facto Dollarization and 
Euroization in Transition Countries.  Paper presented at the 8
th Dubrovnik Economic Conference “Monetary Policy 
and Currency Substitution in the Emerging Markets, 26-29 June 2002, and also at the American Economics 
Association Annual Meeting, January 2003, Washington D.C. 
9 Using the same comparison as for 1999 (using May 2003 data and an estimate for population for 2003), average 
USD per Kazakhstani is 33,880 USD. 
10 Feige, E. 2003: p. 14.  
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Dollarization is said to have begun in 1993-1994 when inflation rose sharply.  This 
would offer an explanation as to why households are so likely to hold their savings in foreign 
currency accounts. 
Differences between households and firms in dollar-holdings. 
It would appear that 70 to 80 percent of money supply exists in the form of bank deposits.  The 
remaining 20 to 30 percent exist mainly in the form of cash.  The actual data on currency 
holdings are not available, although Feige (2003) has estimated that currency substitution in high 
in Kazakhstan, based upon a proxy method of estimation.  Bank assets are available and they 
show that more money is being held in the form of dollars than in tenge. 
Feige suggested that Kazakhstan is at the forefront for dollarization among FSU 
countries.  At the same time, investment analysts are finding that the banking system in 
Kazakhstan is among the best in the FSU.  So why is dollarization so extreme in Kazakhstan?   
The National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) supervises banks, which are required to submit 
financial statements concerning their accounts.  These statements include data for both dollar and 
tenge accounts and “physical” (household) accounts and “juridical” (corporate) accounts. 
Table 1: Bank Deposits, Household and Corporate, Tenge and Dollar Accounts 
Year  Deposits of Physical Accounts    Deposits in Juridical Accounts 
  in tenge (1000)  in USD    in tenge (1000)  in USD   
1998  20,967,246    10,672,096      33,871,219    42,683,189 
1999  28,347,064    26,643,965      57,870,313    67,047,331 
2000  32,917,759    58,791,173    105,331,659  108,984,143 
2001  49,469,927  136,609,855  119,378,116  182,284,828 
2002  57,371,577  187,609,029  122,303,239  116,786,446 
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan 
We see from Table 1, that households are more likely to have assets stored in dollars than 
are firms.  We see slightly increasing ratio of assets in dollars to tenge for households.  
Today a significant differential is evident in saving in dollars vs. tenge between 
households and firms, as seen in Figure 1. While funds in local currency accounts are increasing, 
more saving is maintained in foreign currency, rather than local currency, accounts, particularly 
by households.  Dollarization by firms may be falling, indicating different perspectives or 
different degrees of risk aversion.  
6 
Figure 1: Dollar (Valuty) Accounts to Tenge Accounts Ratio  
“Physical,” i.e., Individual, Accounts or Juridical,” i.e., Corporate, Accounts 
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan 
A divergence between the asset-storing behavior of firms and households is evident.  This trend 
seems apparent after 1999.  While households hold only 10.46 percent of bank deposit assets, 
94.6 percent of these holdings are in valuty, or foreign current deposit, accounts.  The rise in 
households’ FCD is shown in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2:  Breakdown of Households’ Bank Assets, nominal, mil. USD 
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan 
What does this tell us?  It tells us that individual consumers lack confidence in their local 
currency and monetary system.  If savers were risk-neutral, or if risks from saving in dollars 
were equal to risks from saving in tenge, we would expect depositors to be indifferent.  This is 
not what is observed. 
How to explain demand for dollar-accounts? 
One obvious explanation for dollarization, especially when it occurs in household 
accounts, is fear, or risk aversion.  What fear is this?  Individuals fear high inflation that will 
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happen after prices that had been controlled adjusted to world prices.   Many people tell stories 
of how their parents lost a lifetime of savings when their savings from Soviet earnings could no 
longer purchase a fraction of what it had.  What other kind of risk do people try to avoid by 
saving in dollars?  They fear relative currency devaluation through worsening exchange rates.  
When the government decided to float the tenge,  the value of the tenge fell to a small percentage 
of its former exchange value in a matter of days. 
The government elected to move from a fixed to a floating exchange rate in April 1998.  
This naturally was followed by wide adjustments in the Kazakh tenge during 1998 and 1999..  
Consequently, the tenge depreciated against the dollar until 2003 when the dollar fell, as can be 
seen in Figure 3 below.   
The explanation given by the World Bank for this government response was that 
depreciation of the tenge would counteract lagging foreign direct investment due to falling oil 
prices
11 and help trade.  Russia was Kazakhstan’s main trading partner; the Russian Crisis 
decreased demand for Kazakhstani metals and other goods. However, allowing the tenge to float 
was a deliberate decision, accompanied by IMF support.  Regardless of the reasons for this 
reform, allowing the tenge to float resulted in an increase in the exchange rate of tenge-to-
dollars, or depreciation. 
These events  are common to all developing countries.  A developing country may 
experience high inflation and exchange rate variability.   
Figure 3: Kazakh Tenge per USD, Kazakhstan, Jan. 1998 to Feb. 2003 
                                                           































Source: National Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
Over this period, the exchange rate Kazakh tenge per dollar (KZT/USD) grew from 76 to 
a high of 156. The downturn at the end of this trend indicates the beginning of USD 
depreciation. The tenge may have begun to float in 1998, but the real depreciation came one year 
later when the price of a dollar in tenge increased 34 percent.   
The inflation rate was been in the double digits, and has risen steadily, as seen in Figure 
4. (This was after it exceeded one thousand percent in 1992 and two thousand percent in 1993.)  
Kazakhstan did not experienced true “hyperinflation,” but hyperinflation is not needed for the 
inflation rate to influence the foreign deposit rate.  
The last five years have experienced monthly inflation and deflation, with extreme 
variability in March and April of 1998; otherwise, statistics ranged from –1.0 to 4.8 percent 
monthly inflation. Overall inflation between April 1998 and June 2003 was been 47 percent. The 
inflation rate for 2002 was 12 percent.   

























Source: National Statistics Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
A lack of confidence in the domestic currency may increase valuty holdings.  Histories of 
inflation and currency devaluation will increase dollarization, as locals attempt to minimize 
seignorage costs and exchange risks.  Inflation rates, as indicated here by CPI, are likely to be 
important in predicting dollarization.  Although inflation and exchange rate risk are the most 
common explanations given for dollarization, there are many variables that could increase 
dollarization, that we cannot yet include, because monthly data are not available.    Much of 
Kazakhstan’s economic growth has been a result of FDI and resource exports. For example, the  
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correlation between the deposit ratio and oil and gas FDI is 0.80.   These factors may influence 
both savings and the propensity to save in dollars as opposed to in tenge.   
It is also relevant to point out the considerable role of FDI in Kazakhstani banking. 
Between 1993 to 2000, 206 million (nominal) USD of FDI were invested in the financial sector. 
Of this $206 million, 93 percent was in monetary intermediation (192.3 million USD).   
International trade may increase dollar asset holdings.  It is possible that foreign currency 
deposits are a result of foreign investors who wish to decrease transaction costs by holding firm 
assets in dollars.  This may make it easier to repatriate profits. 
Because of bank failures in the past, people may believe that holding dollars is a better 
way to safeguard their assets.  That is, they may believe that banks that hold dollar assets 
themselves are more secure.   
Many banks that opened early in the reform process failed. Between 1997 to 2000, the 
total number of domestically- and foreign-owned banks registered in Kazakhstan fell from 82 to 
47.  In 1997, the most frequent level of bank capitalization was 80 to 130 million tenge.
12  By 
2000, no bank held such little capital stock, and the mode for capital stock had risen to 500 to 
1300 million tenge.
13   The number of undercapitalized banks decreased while assets per bank 
increased over time. Dollar account data were first reported in December 1997, so there are 
insufficient data to measure the effects of bank closings statistically.   
The above variables are unfortunately not considered because of lack of available data.  
For now, we can only look at the simple correlations for annual data.  Some of these are 
presented in the Appendix, in Figures 6 to 10.    These suggest that the deposit ratio of FCD to 
TCD increases with GNP, FDI, net exports, and monthly salary, and decreases with population. 
Demand for dollar-accounts. 
  With the monthly data for bank deposits, CPI, and exchange rates, let us explore which 
most impacts Kazakhstani asset holders.  The dependant variable is the ratio of foreign currency 
deposits (FCD) to total currency deposits (TCD), which tells us the percentage of bank assets for 
which a foreign currency is preferred over the local currency for maintaining the value of one’s 
savings. 
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1997, this value is $1.1-$1.7 million dollars.  
13 Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik Kazahstana 2001: 396  
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  Figure 5 indicates the increase over time of foreign deposits relative to total deposits.  
The overall ratio has increased to higher than 60 percent, although 2003 saw a decrease in this 
ratio. 
Figure 5: FCD/TCD, Jan. 1998 to Feb. 2003 
Source: National Bank of Kazakhstan 
It is possible that dollarization peaked at the beginning of 2002 at 64 percent.  The trend still 
remains quite high, with more than 50 percent of bank savings stored in a foreign currency. 
The best estimation for modeling the deposit ratio uses OLS methods. The logged value 
of the ratio of FCD to TCD is estimated as a function of inflation and the exchange rate.  The 
expected sign for CPI is positive; inflation will decrease the value of one’s savings in tenge.  The 
expected sign for the exchange rate of KZT to USD is positive; depreciation or an increase in 
KZT/USD means that $1 is equal to more tenge, so the preference for dollars should increase.  
The logged model without a constant is reported below.  Using this monthly data from 1998 to 
2002, we see that: 
 
where  DEP=deposit ratio=FCD/TCD; CPI=consumer price index; EXCH=KZT/USD.  
Coefficients are highly significant.  The expected sign for CPI is observed. When there is 
inflation, asset dollarization rises.  The expected sign for the exchange rate is not observed. 
When $1 acquires fewer tenge (the exchange rate of KZT/USD falls)  dollarization rises.  This 
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Another interpretation of a logged equation such as this is the percentage by which inflation and 
exchange rate contribute to dollarization.  For every 1 percent increase in inflation, there is a 
corresponding 1.76 percent increase in dollarization, and for every 1 percent decrease in the 
KZT/USD exchange rate, there is a two-tenths’ percent increase in dollarization.  This suggests 
that, judging from data from the 1990s, households and firms fear high inflation more than a fall 
in the exchange rate. 
When using nonlagged variables, we see a small, nearly zero, coefficient for EXCH, 
although the R
2 value is higher (89 percent is explained).  This suggests that although the growth 
of the tenge decreases dollarization, that the exchange rate is not as important as is inflation.  
This model is not included here.   
Is there a lag-effect, and if so, what is the duration of the lag?  That is, how long does it 
take households and firms in Kazakhstan to respond to an increase in inflation or a fall in the 
exchange rate?   
The initial  model included independent variables for time, a constant, contemporaneous 
and  three monthly lagged variables for changes in the price-regime and exchange-regime.   This 
successfully explained 96 percent of deviation in dollarization, but most of the lags were 
superfluous. 
As variables were dropped for lack of significance, the current exchange rate became 
significant only at the 75
th percentile.  When all insignificant variables were dropped, the 
remaining model was: 
94 . 0
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As the non-lagged equation suggested, inflation was far more relevant to dollarization, than was 
the exchange rate.  Past behavior (past dollarization) predicted current behavior. Lags beyond 
one month lack importance. Both INFL variables’ coefficients were significant, but the past lag 
reversed the sign.     
Perhaps instead of expecting trends to continue, people expect the opposite.  When 
inflation was high, they may have thought, “prices cannot go higher,” or when prices seemed 
stable, they thought, “this cannot continue.”  This equation also suggests habit-formation; if 
assets were saved in dollar accounts last month, they will be saved in dollar accounts this month.  
12 
The fact that exchange rate is not important tells us something interesting.  Firstly that 
Kazakhstanis fear inflation, but trust the tenge.  The tenge is readily convertible and has 
appreciated relative to the dollar.  This would seem to calm asset holders.  Inflation, on the other 
hand, seems less predictable. 
One thing that is observable in Kazakhstan is that many prices do not reflect world prices 
as of yet.  Prices for domestic goods are very low and prices for imported goods are higher than 
can be explained by transportation costs.  This lack of market integration with global markets 
suggests that prices will continue to adjust and that people cannot accurately predict future 
prices. 
Conclusion. 
This paper does not seek to quantify dollarization, but to compare two risks that could cause 
asset dollarization.  It seeks to improve our understanding of dollarization in the FSU, using 
more than five years’ of Kazakhstani data.  It is important to remember that Kazakhstan is one of 
the “successful” transition economies in the CIS.  Hence, behavioral responses to these risks may 
be greater in other CIS countries. 
The data shortage does not diminish what we have learned regarding policy.  Avoidance 
of risk from inflation appears to play a greater role than does exchange rate risk.   
The general statistics indicate that the preference for dollars is stronger among household 
savers than with firms.  The trend has been increasing dollarization, even as structural reforms 
have been established that create a much healthier macroeconomy. 
Dollarization as a whole is only dangerous to the Kazakhstani economy insofar as it 
limits monetary control and opens up the economy to a type of contagion effect if the dollar 
becomes destabilized.  However, there is probably much less risk of the dollar becoming 
destabilized than there is the tenge destabilizing, which also is a very small risk.  The U.S. dollar 
impacts the domestic real money supply,
14 when money supply is estimated as a function of 
national income, local and foreign currency deposits, and interest rates.  This impacts monetary 
policy and the ability to conduct seignorage.  However, given Kazakhstan’s Transparency 
International corruption rating and high income, consumption, export taxes and fines levied on 
                                                           
14   This result is from unpublished work outside of this research paper.  The coefficient for foreign deposits is 
positive and statistically significant at the 99th percentile.  The foreign interest rate is negative and statistically 
significant at the 90th percentile.  
13 
producers, the lack of seignorage taxes may be a boon to those who work and live in Kazakhstan.  
Nevertheless, it remains that dollarization will influence monetary policy, while at the same 
time, monetary and fiscal control may be that which most influences asset-dollarization.   
If authorities wish to fully control the money supply, the National Bank of Kazakhstan 
will have to take appropriate measures.  The IMF has recommended that dollarization be curbed, 
but that the NBK maintain dollar accounts as a saving option.  Taking appropriate measures is 
made more difficult by foreign capital that floods into the country (FDI) and high rates of GDP 
growth (about 10 percent annually).  The government is beginning to loosen its tight fiscal 
control.  Expanding transfer payments, decreasing taxes, and more government spending will 
increase inflation. It is not clear how well Kazakhstanis understand the relationship between 
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Figure 6:  Correlation between Deposit Ratio and Growth of GNP, 1998-2001 
 
Figure 7: Correlation between FDI and Deposit Ratio, 1998-2002 
 







































































Figure 9: Correlation between Population Growth,  1998-2002 
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